For a 3-dimensional cooperative vector field F , we present a new global stability result which is the same as that of Hirsch [4] except that we do not assume that Div F < 0 or that the equilibrium is stable. Thus we solve the "interesting problem" pointed out by Hirsch [4].
Introduction
In a series of papers [1] [2] [3] [4] , Hirsch investigated cooperative systems and obtained many very important results, which show that most trajectories are stable and approach the set of equilibria and that limit sets are invariant sets of systems with dimension one lower. Using the order-preserving properties of cooperative systems and the first Cech cohomology group, he [4] proved that for 3-dimensional cooperative systems every cycle K lies on the boundary of a semi-invariant closed 3-cell which is contained in every order interval containing K . Applying this result, he showed the following global stability theorem: Theorem A (Hirsch). Let F:X->R be a C cooperative vector field. Suppose the following conditions hold:
(b) Div F < 0 in a dense set;
(c) every forward semi-orbit has compact closure in X; and (d) there is a unique equilibrium p, and it is asymptotically stable.
Then p is globally asymptotically stable.
Meanwhile, he pointed out that "It is an interesting problem to determine the validity of Theorem A (for cooperative systems) when hypothesis (b) is weakened to Div F < 0, or when stability of p is not assumed." For irreducible cooperative systems he proved that the conclusion of Theorem A holds under considerably weaker hypotheses: In addition to (a) and (c), he need only assume (e) there is not more than one equilibrium.
It is the purpose of this note to prove the following theorem.
Theorem B. If F : X -► R is a C' cooperative vector field and the conditions (a), (c), and (e) AoW, i/ïe« there exists a unique equilibrium p and it is globally asymptotically stable.
Our result shows that, in order to guarantee that F has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium, the hypotheses (b), stability of p, and irreducibility are not necessary. Therefore, we solve the "interesting problem" pointed out by Hirsch.
Remark. Obviously, (c) and (e) are necessary conditions for F to have a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem B
We first establish some definitions and notation. A C vector field F:I->M" is called cooperative if its derivative matrices DF(x) have nonnegative off-diagonal entries.
We use the following notation for the vector order in R :
x < y if x' < y (¿=1,2,3), x < y if x < y and x / y, The interior and the boundary of a set S are denoted by Int(50 and dS, respectively. The flow generated by F is denoted by <j>t(x) = x(t). Let co(x) denote the omega limit set of x e X and R+ = {x e R : x > 0}. In the following, we consider only 3-dimensional cooperative systems. Proof. Fix x e X. If oj(x) contains an equilibrium, then the conclusion follows from (e). If co(x) contains no equilibrium, then co(x) is a cycle [1, Theorem 4.1]. Therefore, the conclusion follows from Lemma 2 and (e).
Lemma 4. Let F be a 2-dimensional cooperative vector field and x(t) = (x (t), x (t)) be a solution defined for -co < t < 0, or for 0 < t < co. Then x'(t) is monotone for \t\ sufficiently large.
This lemma is adapted from [2, p. 432].
License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see http://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use Set n' = {x e R3+ : x' = 0}. Recall from Lemma 3 that the system has a unique equilibrium at p = (p , p , p ). Lemma 5. Suppose co(x) c p + 9R+, where the operation + denotes setwise addition. If y = (y , y , y ) e oe(x) with y1 > p1 and y' > pj for distinct i, j, k, then y(t) ep + nk for t e R.
Proof. We prove the case i = 1, j = 2, k -3. Proofs of other cases can be carried out in a similar manner.
By invariance, y(t) e co(x) c p+dR3+ for t e R. It follows from y e p+dR3+ and y' > p' for » = 1,2 that y3 = p3. Therefore, y(t) e p + Int(7i3) for |/| sufficiently small. Set t* = sup{t:y3(x)=p3 for all t G [0, /]}.
Obviously, t* > 0. We assert that t* = +co. Otherwise, t* < +co. By the definition of t* and the continuity of y(t), y3(t) = p3 for / e [0, t*], and either y (t*) = p or y (t*) = p . Without loss of generality, we suppose the latter case occurs. Let F = (Fx, F2, F3). Then (y (t), y (t)) for t e [0, t*] is a solution of the following 2-dimensional cooperative system:
It is easy to see that (x, y) = (p , p ) is also a solution of (1). It follows from px < yx, p2 < y2, and the Kamke theorem [5, p. 27] that px < yx(t*) 2 2* 2*2 and p < y (t ), contradicting y (t ) = p . This contradiction shows that t* = +00 ; that is, y(t) ep + 7z3 for t > 0. If there is tx < 0 such that y(tx) £ p + n3, then y(tx) e (p + lrñ(n1)) for i ^ 3 . Suppose y(tx) e p + \rñ(n2). Then, as just proved, y(t) e p + n for t > tx , which contradicts y e p + Int(7r ). This contradiction proves Lemma 5.
Proof of Theorem B. We first show that co(x) =p for a: e (p+R3+)r)X. Observe Because co(x) is a cycle, there is a point y = (yx, y2, y3) e co(x) such that y' -p' > 0 for two indices ». By Lemma 5, oe(x) c p + nJ for some j, that is, a>(x) is a cycle of a 2-dimensional cooperative system, contradicting Lemma 4. This contradiction shows that co(x) contains the equilibrium p. If co(x) -p t¿ 0, then, by the uniqueness of the equilibrium p, there exists a point y e co(x) such that y' -p' > 0 for two indices ». By Lemma 5, y(t) e p + nJ for some j and all (el; that is, y(t) is a solution of a 2-dimensional cooperative system. Restricting attention to that 2-dimensional system, and applying Lemmas 3 and 4, we know that lim/ -> ±ooy(t) = p. Therefore, there exists a real number T > 0 such that y(-T) < y. By the Kamke theorem, p<y(-T)<y<y(T)<---<y(nT).
It follows that p = lim« -► ooy(nT) > y > p, a contradiction. This proves that co(x) = p for x e (p + R+) ill.
In an analogous way, we can prove that co(x) = p for x e (p -R+) n X. Hence, for any x e X, there are points u « x « v such that the forward orbits of u and v tend to p . The Kamke theorem now shows that the forward orbit of x also limits at p ; i.e., lim t -> oox(t) = p for all x e X.
It remains to prove that p is stable. For any neighborhood U c X of p, we can choose u,v in X such that u « p « v and [u, v] This completes the proof of Theorem B.
